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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of corporate governance attributes, 
i.e. board size, age diversity, risk management committee and internal audit function with the 
business performance of the organisation. In addition, this study also examines the role of 
external audit quality as a moderating effect in the relationship between corporate governance 
and business performance. The study adopted a quantitative approach and cross-sectional 
design where it used a sample of 120 listed companies in Malaysia for the year 2016. Data is 
collected based on secondary data which is annual report year 2016. The result shows board 
size and the existence of risk management committee are negatively significant related to 
business performance while the other variables such as age diversity and internal audit function 
do not have an impact on business performance. Unexpectedly, external audit quality does not 
play a moderating role in related corporate governance and business performance. The study 
contributes to the understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and business 
performance in the developing country. The paper also provides related insight for regulators, 
policymakers and investors of emerging markets such as Malaysia. The study is the pioneer to 
understand the relationship of the risk management committee to business performance and 
moderating effect of external audit quality. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, risk management committee, internal audit, external audit 
quality 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous financial scandals around the world and the financial crisis has alerted 
companies and brought attention to the public and government on the importance of corporate 
governance. There are many financial scandals or companies failures around the world such as 
the Enron, WorldCom and event of financial crisis 1997 and 2008 which has caused the fall of 
Lehman Brothers one of the largest banks in the United States. Corporate governance has been 
an important factor for a firm to remain competitive at a global level (Ehikioya, 2009; Iwasaki, 
2008). Corporate governance provides guidance to the company how they can be directed or 
controlled in order to strengthen the company process which ultimately brings good benefits to 
the company (Ehikioya, 2009). Good corporate governance is considered to be crucial to any 
company in order to have long term success and survive the financial crisis if it happened again. 
Good corporate governance practices can bring a positive effect on firm performance during 
the financial crisis of 2008 (Kowalewski, 2016). 
 52 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BUSINESS PERFORMANCE: 
THE MODERATING ROLE OF EXTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY 
 
Wong Seng Foong1, Yuvaraj Ganesan2*, Anwar Allah Pitchay3, Hasnah Haron4, Ratih 
Hendayani5 
1,2 Graduate School of Business, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 Penang, Malaysia. 
3School of Management, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 Penang, Malaysia. 
4Faculty of Industrial Management,Universiti Malaysia Pahang, 26300 Pahang,Malaysia. 
5School of Economics and Business, Telkom University, Bandung, Indonesia. 
*Corresponding author: yuvaraj@usm.my 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of corporate governance attributes, 
i.e. board size, age diversity, risk management committee and internal audit function with the 
business performance of the organisation. In addition, this study also examines the role of 
external audit quality as a moderating effect in the relationship between corporate governance 
and business performance. The study adopted a quantitative approach and cross-sectional 
design where it used a sample of 120 listed companies in Malaysia for the year 2016. Data is 
collected based on secondary data which is annual report year 2016. The result shows board 
size and the existence of risk management committee are negatively significant related to 
business performance while the other variables such as age diversity and internal audit function 
do not have an impact on business performance. Unexpectedly, external audit quality does not 
play a moderating role in related corporate governance and business performance. The study 
contributes to the understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and business 
performance in the developing country. The paper also provides related insight for regulators, 
policymakers and investors of emerging markets such as Malaysia. The study is the pioneer to 
understand the relationship of the risk management committee to business performance and 
moderating effect of external audit quality. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, risk management committee, internal audit, external audit 
quality 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous financial scandals around the world and the financial crisis has alerted 
companies and brought attention to the public and government on the importance of corporate 
governance. There are many financial scandals or companies failures around the world such as 
the Enron, WorldCom and event of financial crisis 1997 and 2008 which has caused the fall of 
Lehman Brothers one of the largest banks in the United States. Corporate governance has been 
an important factor for a firm to remain competitive at a global level (Ehikioya, 2009; Iwasaki, 
2008). Corporate governance provides guidance to the company how they can be directed or 
controlled in order to strengthen the company process which ultimately brings good benefits to 
the company (Ehikioya, 2009). Good corporate governance is considered to be crucial to any 
company in order to have long term success and survive the financial crisis if it happened again. 
Good corporate governance practices can bring a positive effect on firm performance during 
the financial crisis of 2008 (Kowalewski, 2016). 
 
53 
 
In the year 1997, the Asian financial crisis has alarmed the Asia countries to pay 
attention to the reformation of corporate governance. Malaysia is one of the affected counties 
and basically all firms are not able to escape from the Asia financial crisis. Asia financial crisis 
in 1997 has caused Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index begins to plummet and in the 
year 1998 hits its lowest index of all time before the recovery stage. In the year 2007, the US 
market faces the subprime mortgage crisis which eventually leads to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in the year 2008. The effect of the US subprime crisis has eventually caused the global 
recession (Economywatch, 2010). 
Malaysia has a corporate governance issue and one of the cases happened to be on 
1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). 1MDB has been accused of involving in 
controversies such as high debt, corruption and allegations against the state investment funds 
transfer over the third-party account and Malaysian Official One (MO1) account. There is also 
controversy over the appointment of a country's auditor-general to audit the financial account 
of 1MDB by Malaysia’s former Prime Minister,  YB Dato' Sri  Mohd Najib bin Tun 
Abdul Razak and the independence of auditor-general is questioned. The 1MDB scandals 
affected the country’s reputation, investor rational as well as the Malaysian people who are 
furious on this case. Weak corporate governance is a serious issue for 1MDB and the business 
performance is underperforming with having RM50 billion debts as of January 2016. 1MDB 
also dismissed the first two audit firms, Ernst & Young and KPMG when the audit firms request 
for the investment documents (Blemin, 2015). Deloitte then took over the auditor position of 
1MDB. However on 26 Feb 2016 Deloitte Malaysia has resigned as the auditor for 1MDB. Not 
long after resigned, Deloitte Malaysia has issued a statement stating the financial statement of 
2013 and 2014 can no longer be relied upon. Based on the investigation of PAC (2016) on 
1MDB found that the capital financing structure and financial performance are classified as 
“not satisfactory” due to its weak corporate governance.  
Multi-factored reasons such as oil price weakening, 1MDB scandals and weak business 
performance have an effect on the economy of Malaysia and the particular effect will be a 
weakening of the currency and the country’s reputation. The incidents including weak 
corporate governance have created a chain of the problem and affected the business 
performance of Malaysia. Based on the statistics conducted by the DOSM (2017), the expected 
overall business performance of Malaysia in 2016, decreased 1.4 percent while the first quarter 
of 2017 is expected to decrease by 6.9 percent. The senior management in the four major sectors 
in Malaysia namely industry, construction, wholesale & retail trade and services are not 
optimistic about the business performance in Malaysia (DOSM, 2017).   
In 2017, the former executive directors of Welli Multi Corporation Bhd have been 
found guilty for providing a misleading financial statement and face fines of RM400,000 and 
sentence of 6 months jail. The directors have provided misleading revenue figures involving 
over RM141 million in fictitious sales in Welli Multi’s 2005 annual report, reporting a profit 
of RM5 million when in fact it was facing a loss of RM35 million (Aziz, 2017; SCM, 2017). 
This has not been the only case in Malaysia for the year 2017, former Executive Chairman of 
Megan Media Holdings and Former Independent Directors of Transmile Group Bhd have also 
been found guilty in providing false or misleading statements (SCM, 2017). 
Although the business performance of companies appears to be good, it also raised 
doubt whether it is true that the companies have performed as shown in the figure that have 
been disclosed. Internal and external auditors also played an important role in overseeing the 
control of the company which will influence the business performance. External auditors are 
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generally considered to be more independent and many fraud cases can be prevented if the 
external audit quality is strong and sound.  Besides that, the external auditor can improve the 
reputation and the reliability of the financial statement of the company. 
This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance attributes 
(board size, age diversity, risk management committee and internal audit function) and 
business performance. Besides that, the study also intends to determine the moderator effect of 
external audit quality between corporate governance attributes and business performance. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Business performance and corporate governance appear to be the general concern 
among corporations, investors, regulators, researchers and stakeholders. In Malaysia, Bank 
Rakyat Chairman Datuk Harun bin Idris has misused the bank funds of $7.5 million in the year 
1975. In the year 1983, Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF) has suffered a loss of $2.5 billion 
because of giving out unsecured loans or secured loan with overstated asset value. The directors 
of BMF has received bribes in order to approve such big and many amounts of loans. Board of 
Directors are the highest management of one company, therefore, the number of directors or 
the size of the board are largely discussed. It is one of the important factors that has contributed 
to business success. Board size is defined as the total number of directors on the company board 
or the number of board of directors (Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2007; Panasian, Prevost, & 
Bhabra, 2003). Director age may have influences on business performance, higher age of 
director may signal experience, resources, network in the company or industry which can 
improve business performance. Age is a standard or benchmark for the extent of experience 
and a signal of a person's intention to risk-taking (Herrmann & Datta, 2005). Meanwhile, a risk 
management committee is a unit in the company which is responsible for supervisory duties in 
company risk management activities. Risk management committee oversees the key risk area 
on the senior management activities and ensures the company has an appropriate risk 
management initiative in the company (Malaysia, 2010). Indeed internal audit sees its role as 
an independent and objective mechanism to add value and assurance to the company (IIARF, 
2013). Internal audit function is typically involved as a consultant, instead of being directly 
involved in the management of the company (Mohamed, Mat Zain, Subramaniam, Yusoff, & 
Fadzilah, 2012). Carey, Subramaniam, and Ching (2006) states that internal audit activities are 
the core business or competencies of external service provider therefore with a large amount 
of customer using their service they are able to create economies of scale. Knechel, Krishnan, 
Pevzner, Shefchik, and Velury (2012) define audit quality as the execution of a good design 
audit process by experienced auditors who understand the condition and uncertainty of the 
situation well. On the other hand, external audit quality refers to the audit quality performed 
by the external auditor. Performance is illustrated as the process of an individual or groups to 
achieve the goals and objectives while indirectly business performance is defined as how an 
organization managed its employees to achieve the business objectives (Yıldız, Baştürk, & 
Boz, 2014). 
Agency Theory 
In most of the corporate governance study, agency theories are the most fundamental 
theories of all. Agency theory was developed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and it was then 
revised by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency theory explains the relationship between the 
principal and the agents. The principals refer to the company’s owner or the shareholders while 
the agents are the manager or company senior management. The owner or the principal hires 
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and the agent or managers to run the company. The shareholder's agent who are the manager 
or director are delegated by the principal or shareholder to run the business or the company 
(Clarke, 2004). In agency theory, the agents or director or manager are expected to make a 
decision based on the interest of the principal or shareholders. However, according to Padilla 
(2002), the agents are not expected to make a decision totally according to the principal's 
interest. The conflict of interest between the agents and the principals are confirmed by multiple 
authors such as Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Ross (1973). Agency problem arises where there is a separation of ownership, it leads to the 
managers or directors do not perform an action to maximize shareholder's wealth instead they 
tend to action based on self-interest. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework in Figure 1 is based on agency theory to explain the 
relationship of corporate governance attributes (board size, age diversity, risk management 
committee and internal audit function) to business performance. Agency theory explains the 
relationship between the principal and the agents. Besides that, the framework also explains 
the extent of the moderating effect of External Audit Quality to the relationship between 
corporate governance attributes and business performance.  
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of the study 
 
The Relationship between Board Size (BS) and Business Performance (BP) 
Based on agency theory, the firm performance is better with a smaller board size as the 
managers are not acting in the best interest of the shareholders. Some literature has found to 
have a consistency to the agency theory perspectives that smaller board size is positively related 
to business performance (Denis & Sarin, 1999; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Gertner 
& Kaplan, 1996; Yermack, 1996). Gertner and Kaplan (1996) stated smaller board size is 
preferred by shareholder mainly due to the cost incurred and prevent free riders problems 
appear in the board. In the study of Yermack (1996), Tobin's Q was used as the measurement 
for firm value, the result showed smaller board leads to better financial ratios and CEO 
compensations are better as well. According to the study of Zabri, Ahmad, and Wah (2016), 
ROA and ROE are used as the indicator to measure firm performance and the study found 
outboard size is insignificant to ROE while it has a weak negative relationship with ROA. 
Based on the above literature, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1:Board size is negatively related to business performance. 
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The Relationship between Age Diversity (Age) and Business Performance (BP) 
Based on the finding of limited studies on the relationship between director age and 
business performance, the result is not consistent. The studies from multiples authors show a 
negative relationship between age diversity and business performance (Kunze, Boehm, & 
Bruch, 2011; Milliken & Martins, 1996). This is also supported by the study of Faleye (2007) 
where the results reported a negative and significant relationship between age diversity 
(average director’s age) and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Based on the findings from 
Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) and Zimmerman (2008), there is no significant relationship 
between age diversity and business performance. The findings are supported by the study of 
Randøy, Thomsen, and Oxelheim (2006) in the context of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. 
On the other hand, the relationship between age diversity and business performance are 
positively related to each other (Helen, Mandy, & Sidney, 2007; Kilduff, Reinhard, & Mehra, 
2000). The study of  Ararat, Aksu, and Tansel Cetin (2010) and Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, and 
Hanuman (2012) have the same findings there is a positive relationship between age diversity 
and business performance in the context of Turkey and Mauritius. Based on the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H2:Age Diversity is positively related to business performance. 
The Relationship between Risk Management Committee (RMC) and Business 
Performance (BP) 
There are limited studies exploring the aspect of the risk management committee. 
However, there is some literature on risk management. A study by Saeidi, Sofian, and Rasid 
(2014) found that Enterprise Risk Management is positively related to business performance 
because Enterprise risk management brings value to stakeholders, improve the company 
competitive advantage and performance and increase the ability to achieve organization goals.   
Furthermore, based on the research by Mu, Peng, and MacLachlan (2009) risk management is 
positively related to business performance and also the performance of new product 
development. As a contrast, Matthews (2013) argues that there is no significant relationship 
between modern risk management methods developed by a Chinese bank to business 
performance using a financial measure such as ROA.  
Based on the findings of Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012), the presence of a Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) in the board and the situation where the CRO directly reported to boards are 
positively related to business performance. In addition, Kao, Lin, Hsu, and Chen (2011) found 
that risk management leads positive effect to operational efficiency for the financial holding 
company in other words risk management is positively related to business performance as the 
operation is running efficiently. In the same tone, Hadad, Hall, Kenjegalieva, Santoso, and 
Simper (2011) and Cummins and Weiss (2013) indicated the risk management is able to 
improve the productivity and efficiency of financial related companies. 
Based on the above discussion risk management is positively influence business 
performance. However, studies exploring in particularly on the relationship of the risk 
management committee and business performance is limited. In the context of Malaysia, the 
company may subject to political influence, therefore, there may be inexperienced director 
being appointed as the committee member of the risk management committee. Furthermore, 
risk management appears to be one of the responsibilities of the internal audit function and 
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there may cause roles duplication between risk management committee and audit committee, 
therefore, the study hypothesized: 
H3:Risk Management Committee is negatively related to business performance. 
 
The Relationship between Internal Audit function (IAF) and Business Performance (BP) 
In the recent study of  Nyameboame and Haddud (2017), outsourcing resources and 
service gives significant financial benefits for locally owned oil and gas companies. The study 
stated a combination of cost reduction, better access to technology and expertise, the capability 
of outsourcers to handle the company's core issue have led to a better financial performance of 
the organization. The findings are supported by the empirical research of Jiang, Frazier, and 
Prater (2006) there is evidence shown that outsourcing improved cost efficiency of the 
company, however, remains non-significant on productivity and profitability. However, in the 
research of Solakivi, Töyli, Engblom, and Ojala (2011) found that no significant relationship 
between outsourcing and the cost for logistic level, therefore, it has no gain or loss from a 
financial perspective.  
Nagy and Cenker (2002) find that internal audit function varies significantly among 
firms from a traditional assurance orientation to a value-added and consulting orientation with 
most firms landing in between traditional and consulting. Ruud (2003) argues that in today’s 
business environment, the internal audit function has become a major support function for 
management, the audit committee, the board of directors, the external auditors and other 
stakeholders. Australian firms are associated with a commitment to strong risk management 
and firm size with the use of internal audit function. (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). In the 
study of Carcello, Hermanson, and Raghunandan (2005) US public firms’ investment in 
internal audit showed that total internal audit budgets are positively related to company size, 
leverage, financial, service, and utility industries, relative amount of inventory, operating cash 
flows, and audit committee’s review of the internal audit budget. Therefore based on the 
discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4:Internal Audit function (outsource) is positively related to business performance. 
The moderator effect of external audit quality (EAQ) between corporate governance 
attributes and business performance 
Based on previous studies, there are inconsistencies on the result related to corporate 
governance attributes and business performance. Therefore this study introduced external audit 
quality as the moderator. Based on the research of Fuerman (2003), the study found that the 
Big Six audit firm produced higher quality auditor as compared to non-Big Six audit firm. The 
large audit firm is likely to discover earning management because of their expert knowledge 
and motivation to protect its reputation (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). 
Based on capital market studies, the stock market is positively influenced by the switch larger 
audit firm to a company and the response for earning coefficient are also higher for a company 
with large audit firm (Teoh & Wong, 1993). On the other hand, Jang and Lin (1993) found out 
during the initial public offering (IPO) event, the volume of stock with Big Eight Audit firm is 
significantly higher than the stock with the smaller audit firm. In the same aspect, the IPO will 
experience more reasonable pricing when they use the service of big audit firms (Firth & Smith, 
1992). 
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However, this raises a question that if the larger firm has better audit quality then why 
there are lots of big corporate failure or scandal such as Enron. This is supported by the 
empirical research by Eisenberg and Macey (2004) and Tilis (2005) where the studies show no 
evidence of audit quality differentials among large audit firm based on the earning restatement 
data. Furthermore, the majority of studies or views support audit firm size represents the audit 
quality however there is a lack of support or studies on the differentiation of large audit firm 
quality.  
Audit quality is a latent variable or hidden variable that cannot be directly measured. 
Based on previous studies, researchers have used different substitutes as the measurement of 
audit quality such as audit engagement tenure Al-Ajmi (2009), audit structure (Kaplan, Menon, 
& Williams, 1990), audit fees (Hassan, Abdul, & Mahenthiran, 2008), auditor industrial 
experience (Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder, & Davies, 2007) and lawsuit case against company 
and audit firm (Schmidt, 2012). Meanwhile, the most common proxy of audit quality is audit 
firm size which has been adopted by multiple authors (DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Fernando, 
Abdel-Meguid, & Elder, 2010; Kim, Song, & Tsui, 2013; Sundgren & Svanström, 2013). 
In support Sundgren and Svanström (2013) pointed out that a larger firm commonly 
has more resources and technically more knowledgeable than the smaller firm. Besides that, a 
study by Sundgren and Svanström (2014) concludes that smaller firms are likely to omit critical 
audit procedures when the workload is high such as during peak or high volume season. This 
is also agreed by various researchers that the size of an audit firm is positively related to the 
audit quality and the monitoring capability (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Jang & Lin, 1993; Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000). Based on the literature, it has been hypothesized as per below:   
H5(a) External audit quality moderates the relationship between board size and business 
performance. 
H5(b)  External audit quality moderates the relationship between Age Diversity and business 
performance. 
H5(c)  External audit quality moderates the relationship between Risk Management 
Committee and business performance. 
H5(d)  External audit quality moderates the relationship between Internal Audit 
Function(outsource) and business performance. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study applies a quantitative approach with secondary data and adopted cross-
sectional design. The population of this study is the public listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. 
However, financial sectors will be excluded in this study because financial companies are 
subject to the different requirement, rules and regulations required by the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (Devi, Hooper, Uddin, & Tsamenyi, 2011). The unit analysis of this study is a firm. 
This study was adopted adopt non-probability sampling as the companies are selected based 
on top 120 market capitalization indicated in DataStream excluding financial companies as of 
31 Dec 2016. The reason for selecting big size companies because the area of effect is 
considerably larger than small companies if there is corporate governance failure. This is also 
supported by the study of other researchers where the studies found that the activity of large 
companies are having a strong effect on the community (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2005). 
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& Williams, 1990), audit fees (Hassan, Abdul, & Mahenthiran, 2008), auditor industrial 
experience (Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder, & Davies, 2007) and lawsuit case against company 
and audit firm (Schmidt, 2012). Meanwhile, the most common proxy of audit quality is audit 
firm size which has been adopted by multiple authors (DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Fernando, 
Abdel-Meguid, & Elder, 2010; Kim, Song, & Tsui, 2013; Sundgren & Svanström, 2013). 
In support Sundgren and Svanström (2013) pointed out that a larger firm commonly 
has more resources and technically more knowledgeable than the smaller firm. Besides that, a 
study by Sundgren and Svanström (2014) concludes that smaller firms are likely to omit critical 
audit procedures when the workload is high such as during peak or high volume season. This 
is also agreed by various researchers that the size of an audit firm is positively related to the 
audit quality and the monitoring capability (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Jang & Lin, 1993; Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000). Based on the literature, it has been hypothesized as per below:   
H5(a) External audit quality moderates the relationship between board size and business 
performance. 
H5(b)  External audit quality moderates the relationship between Age Diversity and business 
performance. 
H5(c)  External audit quality moderates the relationship between Risk Management 
Committee and business performance. 
H5(d)  External audit quality moderates the relationship between Internal Audit 
Function(outsource) and business performance. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study applies a quantitative approach with secondary data and adopted cross-
sectional design. The population of this study is the public listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. 
However, financial sectors will be excluded in this study because financial companies are 
subject to the different requirement, rules and regulations required by the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (Devi, Hooper, Uddin, & Tsamenyi, 2011). The unit analysis of this study is a firm. 
This study was adopted adopt non-probability sampling as the companies are selected based 
on top 120 market capitalization indicated in DataStream excluding financial companies as of 
31 Dec 2016. The reason for selecting big size companies because the area of effect is 
considerably larger than small companies if there is corporate governance failure. This is also 
supported by the study of other researchers where the studies found that the activity of large 
companies are having a strong effect on the community (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2005). 
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This study utilize secondary data extracted from the annual report (financial ended year 
2016) of the selected 120 companies in Bursa Malaysia. The measurements of variables of 
study shown in table 1.  
Table 1: Measurement of variables 
Variables Measurement Sources 
Business 
Performance (BP) 
Return on asset (ROA) Bhatt and Bhatt (2017); 
Solakoglu and Demir (2016); 
Zabri et al. (2016) 
Board Size (BS) The total number of board directors Zabri et al. (2016); 
Johl, Kaur, and Cooper 
(2015); 
Otman (2014) 
Age Diversity 
(Age) 
The coefficient of variation to measure the 
age diversity by dividing the standard 
deviation of board members' age by the 
mean of their age 
 Xu, Zhang, and Chen 
(2017);Shehata, Salhin, and 
El-Helaly (2017);Ali, Ng, and 
Kulik (2014) 
Risk Management 
Committee (RMC) 
Binary variable where "1" indicates 
companies have risk management 
committee and "0" indicates the company 
does not have a risk management committee 
 Yatim (2010) 
Internal Audit 
Function (IAF) 
Binary variable where "1" indicates some or 
all internal audit activities are outsourced 
and "0" indicates internal audit activities 
performed in-house 
 Carey et al. (2006) 
External Audit 
Quality (EAQ) 
 
Binary variable where “1” is coded for 
external auditors are from BIG 4 audit firm, 
“0” for company does not use BIG 4 as their 
external auditor 
Gaaya et al. (2017); Han, 
Kang, and Rees (2013); 
Nnadi, Efobi, and Oledinma 
(2017). 
 
Firm Size (FS) The natural logarithm of market 
capitalization at the beginning of the year 
Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi 
(2006); Sil Kang, Kilgore, 
and Wright (2011) 
 
RESULTS 
The frequency analysis highlighted that from 120 companies, majority companies have 
a board size of 8 – 9 number of directors and it contributes to 42 percent of the total companies. 
Meanwhile, 81 companies have a risk management committee while the remaining 39 
companies do not have a risk management committee in the company. On other hand, a 
majority of 98 companies used in-house internal audit while the other 22 companies opt for 
outsourcing. Further, 85% sample companies used big 4 as their external auditor while only 18 
companies used non-big 4 companies as their external auditor.  
The data analysis in Smart PLS 3.0 shown that all inner VIF value for independent 
variables are less than 5 as recommended by Hair Jr, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016), 
therefore, this indicates lateral multicollinearity is not a concern in the study. The study model 
has the ability to explain 10.2 percent of the variance in independent variables on business 
performance. Further, the effect size for board size and risk management committee are small. 
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In addition, the model have predictive relevance as the value of Q2 above zero as showed in 
table 2.  
Bootstrapping function whereby the threshold used is based on the one-tailed test for a 
direct approach. Based on the assessment of the path coefficient as depicted in Table 2, only 
Board Size (β = -0.257, p<0.01) and Risk Management Committee (β = -0181, p<0.05) are 
negatively significant with Business Performance. Thus, as expectedly the H1 and H3 are 
supported. Surprisingly, H2 and H4 not supported. The result shown that age diversity and 
internal audit function not influence the business performance.  
Table 2: Hypothesis Testing 
Hypo- 
theses Relationship 
Std. Beta 
(β) 
Std. 
Error t-value Decision R
2 f2 Q2 
H1 BS -> BP -0.257 0.06 4.282** Supported 0.102 0.070 0.021 
H2 Age -> BP 
0.035 0.075 0.463 Not 
Supported 
 0.001  
H3 RMC -> BP -0.181 0.102 1.772* Supported  0.031  
H4 IAF -> BP 
0.014 0.08 0.175 Not 
Supported 
 0.0002  
Note: *p < 0.05, **p<0.01 
Testing the Moderating Effect 
Table 3: Path Coefficient and t-value for Independent Variables with Moderating Effect 
Hypo- 
theses Relationship Std. Beta (β) 
Std. 
Error t-value Decision R
2 
H5(a) BS*EAQ → BP -0.078 0.073 1.063 Not Supported 0.113 
H5(b) Age*EAQ → BP -0.028 0.083 0.333 Not Supported  
H5(c) RMC*EAQ → BP -0.069 0.079 0.876 Not Supported  
H5(d) IAF*EAQ → BP -0.018 0.214 0.083 Not Supported  
Note: *p < 0.05, **p<0.01 
Table 3 summarizes the path coefficient, t-value for each independent variables to a 
dependent variable relationship with moderating effect. Based on the result, unexpectedly all 
the hypotheses are statistically insignificant therefore H5(a), H5(b), H5(c) and H5(d) are not 
supported. However, the comparison of Coefficient of Determination 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 without and with 
External Audit Quality as Moderating effect depicted that 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 of moderating effect is 0.113 
implies that 11.3% variance of business performance is explained by the model. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2changed 
0.011 which indicated an increase of 1.1% invariance. 
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DISCUSSION 
The result revealed that board size is negatively related to business performance. This 
result is consistent with prior US studies for 1252 firm (Cheng, 2008). When the board size 
grows bigger the agency problem becomes bigger. The directors generally do not criticize the 
way of top management or expert method in handling company and the problem is bigger with 
the larger board because the cost of any individual director of not doing the duty of monitoring 
the management is in proportion to the total number of board directors (Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992). Jensen (1993) states that when a board has more than seven or eight it will have a 
communication problem, less efficient and slow in decision making. In Malaysia, the study 
notices some of the family-owned companies hire their family members as a board of directors, 
some are relatively young and this shows that the directors may not have sufficient knowledge 
and experience to question or monitor the top management. Lastly bigger board size may have 
a bigger possibility to have a free rider problem where it is not beneficial to the company and 
consumed company resources. On other hand, this study shown that age diversity not influence 
the business performance. The result is consistent with the prior studies from Bunderson and 
Sutcliffe (2002) and Zimmerman (2008), there is no significant relationship between age 
diversity and business performance. The findings are also supported by the study of Randøy et 
al. (2006) in the context of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The samples selected in this study 
are top 120 market capitalization companies in Bursa Malaysia this indicates that the 
companies are relatively big enough to hire a top expert in their related industries. When the 
companies rely on top managers, the experience of older director and creativity of younger 
director may not be able to contribute to the business performance. 
Meanwhile, the finding reveals the existence of the risk management committee is 
negatively related to business performance. Due to limited studies particularly on risk 
management committee supported with justification, the negative direction has been indicated 
in the hypothesis. Prior studies generally draw a conclusion of risk management is positively 
related to business performance but not risk management committee. Based on the findings, 
the existence of risk management committee is harmful to business performance may be 
because of the risk prevention measure is costly and it may not directly add value or reflect 
onto business financial figures and business performance. Besides that, the risk management 
committee is not mandatory to establish and it can be new to some companies. There may be a 
possibility of having ambiguous or duplicated responsibilities between the audit committee and 
risk management committee which may cause inefficient resource allocation. Conversely, 
internal audit functions is not able to effect the business performance. In the study of Carey et 
al. (2006) finds that cost saving and technical expertise of the external service provider are the 
main reason for choosing outsourcing internal audit function. However, in the selected sample, 
all companies are big companies and outsourcing may have more benefits in cost compared to 
own internal audit department however the cost may be too little to create an impact to 
company's ROA.   
The moderating analysis portrays surprising finding as external audit quality does not 
play moderating role in this study. The finding show that there is no significant moderating 
effect in the relationship between board size and business performance. Previous studies 
showed that there are arguments for and against bigger board size positively affects the 
business. However, external auditors are hired by the company and generally play a role to 
perform an audit to company financial statement where they have no or little impact on to 
company's profitability. The business performance will still depend on the external resources 
brought in by the board, therefore whether big 4 or non-big 4 audit firm does not moderate the 
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relationship between board size and business performance. In addition, external audit quality 
also does not moderate the relationship between age diversity and business performance. Based 
on previous studies there is no consistent result on the relationship between age diversity and 
business performance. There are authors support and against age diversity and some authors 
found that there are no significant between age diversity and business performance. Older 
directors may provide experience and network to resource to the company while younger 
directors may be more risk-taking and creative however business performance still largely 
depends on the management or experts. Director’s age diversity may not be decisive on the 
business performance, therefore external audit quality does not have a moderating effect on the 
relationship between age diversity and business performance. 
Besides that, the result highlighted that the external audit quality does not have 
moderating effect in the relationship between the risk management committee and business 
performance. It could be due to risk management committee supervises and oversees the 
company's risk management policies and activity. The risk measures applied may not provide 
a direct effect on business performance or it may increase cost due to expensive preventive 
measures. External auditors are responsible for financial statement auditing and external audit 
quality does not influence the activities of a risk management committee, therefore, the result 
shows that external audit quality does not moderate the relationship between risk management 
committee and business performance. Furthermore, unpredicted the external audit quality does 
not play moderating role in the relationship between internal audit function and business 
performance although in some cases external auditor were reliance on the work of internal 
auditor. The unexpected result maybe due to the outsourcing internal audit function is more 
cost effective if compared to in-house internal audit however if the company is big and internal 
audit activity is high in-house internal audit may be a better option due to economic of scale. 
External auditors can rely on the work of internal auditors because internal auditors are more 
familiar with the internal process therefore at some point the opinion from internal and external 
auditors can be the same. Besides that, the internal audit department from the big corporation 
can be well qualified and adhered to strict policy. Therefore, the moderating effect of external 
audit quality appears to be not significant to the relationship between internal audit function 
and business performance.  
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
Business performance is considered as one of the most important factors that contribute 
to economic and organization success. All stakeholders such as shareholders, managers, 
employees, supplier, buyer and government always keep an eye on business performance as it 
brings large impacts to many parties. The collective business performance will impact the 
country's economy and individual business performance will have influences on many aspects 
and people depending on the size of the company. Corporate governance appears to be one of 
the determinants of business performance. Corporate governance is always the spotlight of all 
public, government and regulators because it helps to maintain the sustainability of the 
company and balance the interest of the company's stakeholders. Corporate governance gets 
even more attention when there are corporate failures, poor financial performance and financial 
scandals. It guides the company to follow a set of rules, practice and requirement to fortify the 
strength and stability of the company. In Malaysia, all public listed companies are required to 
comply with Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance as introduced by the Securities 
Commission Malaysia.  
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This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance attributes, 
such as Board Size, Age Diversity, Risk Management Committee and Internal Audit Function 
with the business performance. Second, the study intends to find out the moderating effect of 
external audit quality to the relationship of corporate governance and business performance. 
The sample used for this study is 120 top market capitalization public listed companies in Bursa 
Malaysia as generally based on the size of the companies they will have a bigger influence 
towards public or country if the company fails. Four independent variables (board size, age 
diversity, risk management committee, internal audit function), one dependent variable 
(business performance) and one moderator (external audit quality) are tested with PLS. This 
study contributes to the literature of agency theory and corporate governance towards business 
performance. The result of the study supports agency problem point of view that the board or 
committee member may act on self-interest more instead of company interest. Practically, the 
findings serve as a reference to the policy maker, investors and researcher. 
The results showed that board size and risk management committee has a negative 
significant effect on business performance. When the board size gets bigger the company may 
have free riders issue and some companies appointed their family members as the board 
directors which may seem to contribute ineffectively to the company from the public point of 
view. These big companies normally hire a top expert to manage the companies, the directors 
rarely question on policies taken by the management and therefore the cost of individual 
directors does not perform the duty to monitor the management becomes bigger. The 
establishment of the risk management committee may have caused ineffective resource 
utilization or wastage as there may be duplication in responsibilities between the risk 
management committee and audit committee. Besides that, risk management and risk 
preventive implementation can be costly and it does not directly reflect the benefit into business 
performance. 
The study enhance the literature of corporate governance attributes and business 
performance in the context of Malaysia public listed companies. The findings such as board 
size and risk management committee are significantly and negatively related to business 
performance will contribute to the literature of agency theory based on Malaysia environment 
that the board of directors and committee members may act on self-interest instead of company 
interest. Further, some practical implication derived from the research and it can be beneficial 
to an organization, investors or stakeholders. The finding shows that board size and risk 
management Committee are negatively and significantly related to business performance. 
Organization especially the big companies may take the findings and review on the number of 
board members and the necessary on the establishment of risk management committee 
although it is one of the steps up approach in MCCG 2017. Investors may utilize the statistical 
data and result that are disclosed in this study and take the following idea into their investing 
decision. Other researchers and stakeholders may also make use of the study to understand 
more on the corporate governance strength on business performance in Malaysia market. 
Lastly, policymaker can utilize the result to review its current policy on board size and the 
establishment of a risk management committee. 
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